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LIST OF PARTIES-NAMES OF PARTIES
The parties are listed and fully named in the caption
and a list of the parties is therefore not necessary.
Hereinafter,

Forsgren-Perkins

Engineering,

will

be

referred to as Forsgren-Perkins, and Mother Earth Industries,
Inc., will be referred to as Mother Earth.

vi

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
FORSGREN-PERKINS ENGINEERING,

APPEAL NO. 89-0099

Appellant,
vs.
MOTHER EARTH INDUSTRIES, INC.
a Delaware Corporation, and
DELANO DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,
Respondents.
Appeal from the Fifth Judicial District Court
Beaver County, State of Utah
Honorable J. Philip Eves, Judge
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT MOTHER EARTH INDUSTRIES, INC.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered in a civil
contract and mechanics lien action, in the Fifth Judicial
District Court of Beaver County, the Honorable J. Philip
Eves, Judge, presiding.

The appeal was initially taken to

the Utah Supreme Court.

The appeal was then transferred to

the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4)
and 78-2A-3(2)(J) (1953 as amended).

A STATEMENT OF THE CASE, THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS,
AND ITS DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.
This

was

an

action

filed

by

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Forsgren-Perkins Engineering, hereinafter "Forsgren-Perkins11,
to foreclose upon a mechanics lien filed in Beaver County,
Utah.

The Defendant-Respondent, Mother Earth Industries,

Inc., hereinafter Mother Earth, moved to dismiss the claim
for the reason that such claim had already been asserted by
Forsgren-Perkins as a compulsory counter-claim in the Third
Judicial District Court.

The Fifth Judicial District Court

dismissed the Complaint, Forsgren-Perkins made two attempts
to get the Fifth Judicial District Court to reconsider its
decision and Order of Dismissal and then after failing the
second time, appealed from the Order of Dismissal.
A STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
1.

Whether a defaulting party, which has failed to

respond to a Motion to Dismiss as required by Rule 2.8 of the
Rules of Practice of the District Courts, can ask the court
to reconsider its decision and order of dismissal.
2.

Whether a motion for reconsideration, no matter

what it is entitled, is permitted under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
3.

Whether an objection to an Order of the Court that
2

is based solely upon an objection to the underlying decision
rendered by the Court and not to the language of the Order,
can be utilized as a vehicle by the losing party to obtain a
reconsideration of the underlying order.
4.

Whether a technical error committed by a District

Court which consisted of executing and entering an Order on
the fifth day of the five day waiting period inferred by Rule
2.9 of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts can be
grounds for:
a.

A reversal of the underlying order which

itself may not be subject to reversal.
b.

An extension of the time for appeal of

the underlying order.
c.

An excuse that counsel for the losing

party was unaware the order had been entered.
d.

A reversal of the underlying Order which

itself is not subject to reversal.
5.

Whether the Notice of Appeal which was filed by

Forsgren-Perkins more than 30 days after the entry of the
judgment was untimely and the appeal should be dismissed
because either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court
lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
6.

Whether a motion for reconsideration of an order of
3

dismissal can extend the 30 day period for the filing of an
appeal to either the Utah Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The

following

determinative

statutes

and

Rules

of

Procedure, and Rules of Practice apply to this appeal:
1.

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-13-1.

Set forth below.

2.

Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

3.

Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

4.

Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

5.

Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

6.

Rule 2.8 Rules of Practice-District

and Circuit

Rule 2.9 Rules of Practice-District

and Circuit

Courts.
7.
Courts.
VERBATIM RECITATION OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTE.
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-13-1.
Actions
respecting real property.
Actions for the following causes must be tried
in the county in which the subject of the action,
or some part thereof, is situated, subject to the
power of the court to change the place of trial as
provided in this code:
. . . .

(3)
For the foreclosure of all
liens and mortgages on real property.
Where the real property is situated partly in
4

one county and partly in another, the plaintiff may
select either of the counties, and the county so
selected is the proper county for the trial of such
action.
VERBATIM RECITATION OF RULE 2.9.
Rule 2.9. Written Orders, Judgments, and Decrees.
(a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for
the party or parties obtaining the ruling shall
within fifteen (15) days, or within shorter time as
the court may direct, file with the court a
proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity
with the ruling.
(b) Copies
of
the
proposed
Findings,
Judgments, and/or Orders shall be served on
opposing counsel before being presented to the
court for signature unless the court otherwise
orders.
Notice of objections thereto shall be
submitted to the court and counsel within (5) days
after service.
(c) Stipulated settlements and dismissals
shall be reduced to writing and presented to the
court for signature within fifteen (15) days of the
settlement and dismissal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
services

Forsgren-Perkins
consisting

of

performed

BLM

various

permitting,

engineering

concept

design,

engineering design, preparation of plans and specifications,
bidding,

supervision

construction
facility

of

located

a

of

construction,

geothermal

near

Cove

electrical

etc.
power

Fort/Sulphurdale

for

the

producing

Utah.

(See

Complaint of Forsgren-Perkins, R. 1, and Complaint of Mother
Earth attached to Memorandum in Support of Motion for Change

5

of Venue or in the Alternative to Dismiss, R. 15.)
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ACTION
2.

Numerous component parts of the power plant failed

and Mother Earth filed an action against Forsgren-Perkins in
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County
alleging various engineering design errors and failures of
supervision during construction.

(See Complaint of Mother

Earth attached to Memorandum in Support of Motion for Change
of Venue or in the Alternative to Dismiss, R. 15.)
3.
thousands

Mother
of

Earth's

dollars

complaint

worth

of

alleged

hundreds

out-of-pocket

losses

of
to

redesign and rebuild substantial portions of the power plant,
together

with

lost

profits

and

general

damages.

(See

Complaint of Mother Earth attached to Memorandum in Support
of Motion

for Change of Venue or in the Alternative to

Dismiss, R. 15, in particular paragraph 24, et. sea.)
4.

Mother Earth maintained its business office in Salt

Lake County, and Forsgren-Perkins maintained

its place of

business in Salt Lake County, and with fewp exceptions, all of
the contemplated witnesses resided in and about Salt Lake
County, Utah County, and Davis County, or would be flying to
Utah and landing at the Salt Lake City Airport.

(See Mother

Earth Memorandum in Support of Motion for Change of Venue or
6

in the Alternative to Dismiss, R. 15.)
5.

Forsgren-Perkins

responded

to

the

Mother

Earth

Complaint and filed an answer, counterclaim and third party
complaint in the Third Judicial District Court.

In that

counterclaim and third party complaint:
a.
Mother

Forsgren-Perkins
Earth

for

made

$50,389.48,

claim
as

the

against
alleged

remaining amount of fees due Forsgren-Perkins for
its services rendered.
b.
Mother

Forsgren-Perkins
Earth

for

made

alleged

claim

RICE

against

violations,

racketeering, theft by deception, conspiracy, abuse
of

process,

illicit

dealings

with

parties,

subornation of perjury, and scheme or artifice to
defraud.
c.
Ormat,

Forsgren-Perkins
the

supplier

of

made
the

claim

turbine

against
generator

systems for the power producing facility.
d.

Forsgren-Perkins made claim against AMFAC

Plumbing Supply, the supplier of industrial valves.
e.

Forsgren-Perkins made claim against Jay

Hauth an employee of Mother Earth.
(See Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint attached
7

as an exhibit to Mother Earth's Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Dismiss, R. 15.)
6.
reckless

Mother Earth moved for Rule 11 sanctions for the
assertion

of unfounded

claims

contained

in the

Forsgren-Perkins Counterclaim, and to Dismiss portions of the
Counterclaim

and/or for a More Definite Statement.

(See

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11,
and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or in the
Alternative for a More Definite Statement attached to Mother
Earth's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Change of Venue
or in the Alternative to Dismiss, R. 15.)
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ACTION
7.

Forsgren-Perkins filed a separate complaint dated

March 23, 1987, in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and
for Beaver County in which Forsgren-Perkins made demand for
the same $50,389.48 described in its Counterclaim previously
filed, but in addition it asked for foreclosure of the lien
which it had filed in Beaver County.

(See Complaint, and

Lien, R. 1.)
8.

Since the facts and circumstances giving rise to

the claims asserted in the action filed by Forsgren-Perkins
in the Fifth Judicial District Court were identical to the
facts and circumstances giving rise to the claims set forth
8

in

Forsgren-Perkins'

demanded was

counterclaim,

and

identical, Mother Earth

since

filed

the

amount

a Motion for

Change of Venue or in the Alternative to Dismiss, or in the
Alternative to Stay all Proceedings Pending the Outcome in a
Case Filed Previously by Plaintiffs.
9.

(See Motion, R. 12.)

That Motion was served upon counsel for Forsgren-

Perkins on April 27, 1987, was filed pursuant to Rule 2.8 of
the

Rules

of

Practice

of

the

District

accompanied by a supporting memorandum.

Courts, and was

(See Memorandum, R.

15.)
10.

Forsgren-Perkins failed to respond to the Motion

and failed to file a memorandum in opposition as required by
Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice.

(See Index to Record on

Appeal.)
11.

The Fifth Judicial District Court granted Mother

Earth's Motion to Dismiss and notified Mother Earth's counsel
to prepare the appropriate order.

The Order was prepared and

simultaneously mailed to counsel for Forsgren-Perkins and to
the Fifth Judicial District Court.
12.

(See Order, R. 112.)

The Fifth Judicial District Court signed the Order

of Dismissal (R. 112) on June 2, 1987, the fifth day after it
was served upon Forsgren-Perkins.
13.

Forsgren-Perkins

filed
9

"Plaintiff's Exception to

Order of Dismissal and Request for Hearing" (R. 110) , and a
Notice of Hearing

(R. 108) after the District Court had

already ruled on the Motion.
14.
language

(See Minute Entry, R. 107.)

The Exception to Order is not directed to the
of

the

Order, but

instead

is directed

underlying merits of the court's ruling.
15.

to the

(See R. 110.)

The date set for the hearing was continued by

Forsgren-Perkins.

(See Notice of Continuance of Hearing, R.

114.)
16.

Mother

Earth

filed

a

Motion

for

an

award

of

attorney's fees and costs arising out of Forsgren-Perkins1
failure to respond

to the Memorandum

and

its subsequent

attempts to get the Court to reconsider its ruling.

(See

Motion, R. 117.)
17.
in Re:

Forsgren-Perkins then filed "Plaintiff's Memorandum
Order

Prejudice."

for

Change

(R. 119.)

of

Venue

or

Dismissal

Without

In the Memorandum, Forsgren-Perkins

admits the filing of an identical claim in the Third Judicial
District Court, but argues that the proper venue for the
foreclosure is in Beaver County, and that foreclosure of the
lien was not requested

in the claim filed

Judicial District Court.

(See Memorandum, R. 119.)

18.

Forsgren-Perkins'

Memorandum
10

in the Third

(Exhibit,

R.

119)

mistakenly argues that the venue should not be transferred to
Salt Lake County.

However the Order of Dismissal did not

transfer the venue to Salt Lake County.

(See Order of

Dismissal, R. 112.)
19.

Mother Earth filed a Memorandum in Opposition to

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Re: Order for Change of Venue (SIC)
or Dismissal Without Prejudice.
Memorandum

(R. 127.)

Attached to the

is a copy of the Counterclaim

filed by Ormat

against

Forsgren-Perkins

in

the

Court.

The Ormat Counterclaim

Third

Judicial

asserts total claims for

damages of $1,350,000.00 against Forsgren-Perkins.
20.

Forsgren-Perkins

filed

District

an

additional

(R. 127.)
Notice

of

Continuance of Hearing on Plaintiff's Exception to Order.
(R. 165.)
21.

Forsgren-Perkins filed "Opposition to Defendants1

Motion for Sanctions", dated July 8, 1987.
22.

Forsgren-Perkins

filed

(R. 167.)

Plaintiff's

Modification of Order, dated January 4, 1989.

Motion

for

(R. 170.)

The

Motion was accompanied by a Memorandum in Support of the
Motion dated January 4, 1989.
23.

(R. 179.)

Mother Earth filed a Memorandum in Opposition to

Plaintiff's Motion for Modification of Order.
24.

(R. 182.)

Forsgren-Perkins filed a Reply Brief dated January
11

17, 1989, and a Request for Ruling dated January 24, 1989.
(R. 191.)
25.

The District Court denied Forsgren-Perkins' Motion

for Modification

of Order and entered

an

"Order Denying

Plaintiff's Motion for Modification of Order" dated February
21, 1989.
26.

(R. 195.)
Forsgren-Perkins filed its Notice of Appeal dated

March 14, 1989, by which it attempts to cippeal from both the
original Order of Dismissal dated June 2, 1987, and from the
"Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Modification of Order"
dated February

, 1989.

(R. 197.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT NO. 1. FORSGREN-PERKINS FAILED TO FILE ITS NOTICE
OF APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHIN THE 3 0 DAY
PERIOD REQUIRED BY THE RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND
THE APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED.
The notice of appeal was not filed within 3 0 days of the
entry of the Order of Dismissal.

It was filed more than one

year

file

later.

The

failure

to

in

a

timely

manner

constituted a jurisdictional defect and the appeal must be
dismissed.
POINT NO. 2.
THE EXCEPTION TO THE ORDER AND THE
SUBSEQUENT MOTION FILED BY FORSGREN-PERKINS DID NOT EXTEND
THE TIME FOR THE FILING OF AN APPEAL.
Forsgren-Perkins

filed

an exception to the Order of

Dismissal, but did not file a motion to amend the order until
12

more than one year later.

Neither the exception to the order

nor the motion to amend the order tolled the time for the
filing of a timely

notice of appeal.

Forsgren-Perkins'

actions did not toll the 30 day waiting period pursuant to
either the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or the case law so
as to extend the time for the filing of an appeal.
POINT NO. 3. FORSGREN-PERKINS APPEAL FROM THE DENIAL OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF ORDER FAILS FOR THE
REASON THAT AN APPEAL MAY NOT BE TAKEN FROM SUCH AN ORDER.
Forsgren-Perkins

filed

an

untimely

modification of the Order of Dismissal.

motion

for

a

The motion was filed

more than a year after the Order of Dismissal was entered.
Under Utah case law, an appeal may not be taken from an
untimely motion to modify an Order.
POINT NO. 4. THE TRIAL COURT fS CONDUCT WAS GOVERNED BY
RULE 2.8 OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE OF THE DISTRICT COURTS, AND
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION AND DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT WAS IN CONFORMITY THEREWITH.
Forsgren-Perkins defaulted, and failed to respond to
Mother Earth's motion to dismiss within the 10 days specified
in Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts.
Upon its failure to respond, the District Court ruled on and
granted Mother's Earth's motion to dismiss.

Such procedure

was in conformity with the Rules of Practice of the District
Courts.

13

POINT NO. 5. FORSGREN-PERKINS SHOULD HAVE ASSERTED ITS
RIGHT TO A FORECLOSURE OF THE MECHANICS LIEN WHEN IT FILED
ITS COUNTER-CLAIM. THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT DID NOT
LACK JURISDICTION OVER THE LIEN FORECLOSURE.
Forsgren-Perkins was a defendant in an action filed in
the Third Judicial District Court.

In that action, Forsgren-

Perkins filed a compulsory counterclaim in which it asserted
its right to recover for alleged unpaid services rendered by
Forsgren-Perkins.

Forsgren-Perkins asserted

recover

services,

for

the

but

it

did

its right to

not

request

a

foreclosure of its mechanics lien, although it could have
done so.

The Utah State Statute regarding foreclosure of

mechanics liens merely prescribes the venue for trial, which
venue can be changed, but does not limit the jurisdiction of
the courts to the county in which the mechanics lien is
filed.
POINT NO. 6.
THE CASES CITED BY FORSGREN-PERKINS IN
THEIR BRIEF ARE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE CASE AT HAND, AND
ARE NOT CONTROLLING LAW.
Forsgren-Perkins cited a number of cases which were not
applicable to the case at hand.

Although Forsgren-Perkins

attempted to draw analogies, they failed in light of specific
case law which is directly on point.

In addition, rather

than dealing with controlling Utah case law, Forsgren-Perkins
cited a number of cases from other jurisdictions.

14

POINT NO. 7. MOTHER EARTH DISAGREES WITH SEVERAL OF THE
FACTUAL REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY FORSGREN-PERKINS IN ITS
BRIEF.
Mother Earth did not agree to any extensions of time
within which to respond to the Motion to Dismiss, and Mother
Earth did not agree to a change of venue.
POINT NO. 8.
FORSGREN-PERKINS SHOULD BE CHARGED WITH
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE THAT THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL HAD BEEN
SIGNED AND ENTERED BY THE COURT.
Although Forsgren-Perkins relies, to a great extent,
upon

its

claim

that

it was

unaware

that

the Order of

Dismissal had been entered, the circumstances surrounding the
service of the Order upon Forsgren-Perkins and subsequent
notifications to Forsgren-Perkins were such as to either
constitute notice the Order had been entered, or were such as
to charge Forsgren-Perkins with a duty to inquire, or in
other words constituted

constructive notice the Order of

Dismissal had been entered.

15

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1
FORSGREN-PERKINS
FAILED TO FILE ITS
NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF
DISMISSAL WITHIN THE 30 DAY PERIOD
REQUIRED BY THE RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME
COURT AND THE APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED.
Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court provides
in part as follows:
(a)
Appeal from final judgment and order.
"In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a
matter of right from the district court to the
Supreme Court, the notice of appeal required by
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the
district court within 30 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from . . .
(b)
Motions post judgment or order.
If a
timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is filed in the district court by any
party: (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under
Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of
fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment
would be required if the motion is granted; (3)
under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or
(4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for
appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of
the order denying a new trial or granting or
denying any other such motion. . .
•

• • • it

The failure to file a Notice of Appeal within 30 days
after the entry of a final order of dismissal is fatal and
constitutes a jurisdictional defect.

In Steiner v. State, 27

Utah 2d 284, 495 P.2d 809 (1972), the District Court granted
a motion to dismiss.

The Plaintiffs did not file a motion to

16

alter

or

amend

the

order

entered

by

the

Court.

The

Plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint which was
expressly prohibited by the order of dismissal.

The District

Court granted a motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

The

Utah Supreme Court held the time for filing a notice of
appeal commenced to run from the date of the entry of the
original order of dismissal, not the date of the subsequent
order of dismissal of the amended complaint.
In the case at hand, the Order of Dismissal was entered
on June 2, 1987.

The Notice of Appeal is dated March 14,

1989, almost two years after the Order of Dismissal was
entered.

Forsgren-Perkins did not appeal from the Order of

Dismissal within the 30 days required by Rule 4 of the Rules
of the Utah Supreme Court.

The failure to file a timely

appeal is jurisdictional and neither the Utah Supreme Court
nor the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear the appeal
from the Order of Dismissal entered June 2, 1987.
Having failed to file the notice of appeal from the
Order of Dismissal within the 30 days required, the appeal
must be dismissed.
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POINT NO. 2
THE EXCEPTION TO THE ORDER AND THE
SUBSEQUENT MOTION FILED BY FORSGRENPERKINS DID NOT EXTEND THE TIME FOR THE
FILING OF AN APPEAL.
Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court provides
for an extension of the time to file an appeal.

Forsgren-

Perkins1 reliance upon Rule 50(b), Rule 52 and/or Rule 59
URCP is not well taken.

Rule 50(b) URCP pertains to a motion

for a directed verdict and is not applicable to the case at
hand.

Rule 52 URCP pertains to "Findings" made by a trial

court and is not applicable.

Rule 52(b) URCP provides as

follows:
"(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made
not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the
court may amend its findings or make additional
findings and may amend the judgment accordingly.
The motion may be made with a motion for a new
trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact
are made in actions tried by the court without a
jury, the question of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the findings may thereafter be
raised whether or not the party raising the
question has made in the district court an
objection to such findings or has made either a
motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a
motion for a new trial."
It is difficult to see how Rule 52(b) URCP could apply
to the case at hand.

Forsgren-Perkins did not make a motion

for a new trial, or a motion to amend the judgment within 10
days after the entry of the judgment, and no findings of fact
18

were involved•

Rule 59 URCP pertains to New Trials.

Even if

Forsgren-Perkins could claim the right to attack an Order of
Dismissal by filing a motion for a new trial, it must be
filed within 10 days after the entry of the judgment, which
did not occur in the case at hand.

Although Forsgren-Perkins

refers to Rule 60 URCP, it did not make a Rule 60 Motion.
A motion for reconsideration does not extend the time
for filing an appeal.

See Steiner v. State, 27 Utah 2d 284,

495 P.2d 809 (1972)
In Peay v. Peav, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980), the Utah
Supreme Court observed:
". . . It is important to note in this regard
that a party cannot extend the time for filing an
appeal
simply
by filing a "Motion
for
Reconsideration of Order Striking Petition and
Motion for Relief from Final Judgment." As this
Court held in Utah State Employees Credit Union v.
Riding,
We think the motion to reconsider
the motion to vacate the judgment is
abortive under the rules . . .."
The reasoning behind such a ruling was
articulated in Drury v. Lunceford where the Court
ruled as follows:
When [a motion has been made] and
the court has ruled upon the motion, if
the party ruled against were permitted to
go beyond the rules, make a motion for
reconsideration, and persuade the judge
to reverse himself, the question arises,
why should not the other party who is now
ruled against be permitted to make a
19

motion for re-re-consideration, asking
the court to again reverse himself?"
(Id. at 843 0
In Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 1982) ,
the Supreme Court held that an untimely motion for a new
trial "had no effect on the running of the time for filing a
notice of appeal."
Forsgren-Perkins' brief on appeal cites several cases on
which it relies for its claim that the time for appeal was
tolled.

In Pruitt v. Taylor, 247 N.C. 380, 100 S.E.2d 841

(1957), the court had awarded a default judgment in excess of
the

amount

prayed

for

in the complaint

after

Plaintiff

amended the complaint to conform to the proof of damages*
The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a judgment
rendered in excess of the amount prayed for in the complaint,
without notice to the defaulting party was invalid.
In State v. McMullen, 764 P.2d 634 (Utah Pp. 1988) cited
by Forsgren-Perkins, the Court of Appeals appears to hold
that

serving

notice

of

the

order

under

Rule

2.9

was

sufficient, and would not even be required in a criminal
case.

Forsgren-Perkins

mistakenly

claims

that

McMullen

considers a "Request to Reconsider" as a motion for a new
trial.

To the contrary, McMullen appears to hold directly

against Forsgren-Perkins position and holds that failure to
20

file the notice of appeal within 30 days from the date of the
original order of denial of a motion for a new trial was
fatal.

It further holds, the filing of a notice of appeal

from a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion for a
new

trial

was

reconsider

not

improper,
being

an

the

denial

appealable

of

the

motion

judgment.

to

Although

McMullen is a criminal matter, the theory is directly on
point and holds directly against the position of ForsgrenPerkins.
In Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d
42 (Utah App. 1988), the Court of Appeals did indicate that,
by

implication,

Rule

54(b)

URCP

does

allow

for

the

possibility of a trial judge to change his or her mind during
the

course

involving

of

litigation

multiple

parties

where
or

an

order has been made

multiple

ongoing

claims.

However, in the case at hand, the issue was simple, there was
no continuing

litigation and James Constructors does not

appear to have any application.
Forsgren-Perkins» cites Moon Lake Elec. v. Ultra Systems
W. Const., 767 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1988).

While it is true

that Moon Lake held that a motion for new trial filed after a
motion

for summary judgment tolled the time

for appeal,

Forsgren-Perkins did not file a motion for a new trial.
21

Forsgren-Perkins merely filed an exception to the order, and
more than one year later filed the "Motion for Modification
of Order".

(R. 170.)

The time to file the appeal was not extended by virtue
of any of Forsgren-Perkins1 Motions, the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure cited by Forsgren-Perkins, or by any of the case
law relied upon in Forsgren-Perkins1 brief on appeal.
POINT NO. 3
FORSGREN-PERKINS APPEAL FROM THE DENIAL
OF PLAINTIFFfS MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF
ORDER FAILS FOR THE REASON THAT AN APPEAL
MAY NOT BE TAKEN FROM SUCH AN ORDER.
The Notice of Appeal indicates it is also an appeal from
the "denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Modification of Order."
Forsgren-Perkins1

Motion

for Modification

of

Order

is a

motion for reconsideration in which Forsgren-Perkins asks the
Court to reverse the Order of Dismissal.

The Motion for

Modification of Order does not extend the time for the filing
of an appeal from the Order of Dismissal entered June 1,
1987, and is not an order from which an appeal may be made.
(See Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980), and Habbeshaw v.
Habbeshaw,

17

Utah

2d

295,

409

P.2d

972

(1966.)

In

Habbeshaw, the Utah Supreme Court held that an appeal from an
order denying a motion for a new trial was abortive.
Equity does not support Forsgren-Perkins attempts to
22

reverse the ruling of the lower Court.
Order

of

Dismissal

and

the

Since the date of the

subsequent

expiration

of

the

mechanic's

lien, the electrical power generating plant has

been

to

sold

the

City

of

Provo

and

should

the

lien

be

reinstated, it would impact upon property now owned by the
City of Provo.

The same claims of Forsgren-Perkins are still

pending in the Counterclaim filed by Forsgren-Perkins in the
Third Judicial District Court.

Forsgren-Perkins has not and

will not be denied access to the Court to litigate its claim
for

services

rendered.

Forsgren-Perkins

without an enforceable mechanics lien.

will

merely

be

The loss of the lien

rights, if any, in Beaver County is inconsequential given the
nature

of

the

proceedings

in the Third Judicial

District

Court.
POINT NO. 4
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONDUCT WAS GOVERNED BY
RULE 2.8 OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE OF THE
DISTRICT COURTS, AND THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION AND DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT WAS IN CONFORMITY THEREWITH.
Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice of the District Court,
provided as follows:
"(a) All motions, except uncontested or ex
parte matters, shall be accompanied by a brief
statement of points and authorities and any
affidavits relied upon in support thereof. . .
(b)

The responding party shall file and serve
23

upon all parties within ten (10) days after service
of the motion, a statement of answering points and
authorities and counter-affidavits.
(c) The moving party may serve and file reply
points and authorities within five (5) days after
service of responding party's points and
authorities. Upon the expiration of such five (5)
day period to file reply points and authorities,
either party may notify the clerk to submit the
matter for decision.

(f) Decision shall be rendered without a
hearing unless requested by the court, in which
event the clerk shall set a date and time for such
hearing.
ii

. . .

Although the rule was subsequently superceded by the
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, effective October 30,
1988,

it was

the

controlling

rule

at

the

time

of the

dismissal of the above-entitled action.
Mother Earth's Motion to Dismiss supported by memorandum
was uncontested.

Although Forsgren-Perkins was obligated by

Rule 2.8 to file a responsive memorandum within 10 days, it
failed to respond and pursuant to Rule 2.8, the District
Court granted Mother Earth's Motion to Dismiss.
Forsgren-Perkins Memorandum does not address the fact
that it failed to file a responsive memorandum with the lower
court as required by Rule 2.8.

Instead, it concentrates its

attention on the fact that the Order entered by the Court was
24

signed

on

the

fifth

day,

a

technical

rather

than

a

substantive defect,
POINT NO. 5
FORSGREN-PERKINS SHOULD HAVE ASSERTED ITS
RIGHT TO A FORECLOSURE OF THE MECHANICS
LIEN WHEN IT FILED ITS COUNTER-CLAIM.
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT DID NOT
LACK
JURISDICTION
OVER THE
LIEN
FORECLOSURE.
Rule 13 URCP provides in part as follows:
"(a)
Compulsory counterclaims.
A pleading
shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at
the time of serving the pleading the pleader has
against any opposing party, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim and does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the
claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced
the claim was the subject of another pending action
ii

. . .

In

the

case

at

hand,

Forsgren-Perkins

filed

a

counterclaim and made claim for services rendered arising out
of the design and construction of the power plant.

It was

the same transaction or occurrence for which Mother Earth was
claiming

damages

arising

out

of

negligent

design

and

negligent construction supervision.
The counterclaim was clearly compulsory.

At the same

time the counterclaim was filed, Forsgren-Perkins could have
requested a foreclosure of its lien filed in Beaver County.
25

At issue was the question of venue, not jurisdiction.

The

Utah Code Ann. provided as follows:
"Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-13-1.
Actions
respecting real property.
Actions for the following causes must be tried
in the county in which the subject of the action,
or some part thereof, is situated, subject to the
power of the court to change the place of trial as
provided in this code:
. . . .

(3)
For the foreclosure of all
liens and mortgages on real property.
it

. . . .

Forsgren-Perkins

could

have

included

the

claim

for

foreclosure of the mechanics lien in its counterclaim filed
in the Third Judicial District Court.

The Third Judicial

District Court did not lack jurisdiction over the claim.
POINT NO. 6
THE CASES CITED BY FORSGREN-PERKINS IN
THEIR BRIEF ARE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE
CASE AT HAND, AND ARE NOT CONTROLLING
LAW.
In Smith v. Fulyater, 47 Ill.App.3d 662, 365 N.E.2d 92
(1977) , cited by Forsgren-Perkins, the action was put on the
military

calendar,

then

without

notice

counsel, the following actions occurred:
the

case

was

removed

to

Plaintiff's

(1) the case was

assigned;

(2)

calendar;

(3) a pretrial conference was scheduled;
26

from

the

military
and (4)

the action was dismissed for failure of Plaintiff's counsel
to attend the pretrial conference.
warning

Since there had been no

or notice to Plaintiff's counsel of any of the

foregoing

actions,

the

appellate

court

held

that

the

dismissal should be vacated.
In Laidler v. National Bank of Detroit. 133 Mich.App.
85, 348 N.W.2d 42 (1984), the court had neglected to notify
Plaintiff's counsel that the case had been placed on the no
progress docket, so the computer generated dismissal which
automatically followed was set aside.
The following case cited by Plaintiff does not support
Plaintiff's claim.

In Rhiner v. Arends, 292 N.W.2d 399 (Iowa

1980) , a court notice to try or dismiss the case was sent,
the parties stipulated to a continuance, but the case was not
tried on the date of continuance and no further continuance
was filed.

The Iowa court held a second notice was not

necessary and the dismissal entered by the court could not be
set aside.
In McKinley v. Town of Fredonia. 140 Ariz. 189, 680 P.2d
1250

(1984), a letter was drafted to plaintiff's counsel

putting the case on the inactive calendar, which meant that a
dismissal would be entered if a certificate of readiness was
not filed within two months.

The presumption that the notice
27

was received by plaintiff's deceased counsel was overcome by
an affidavit by the secretary that the notice was never
received.

The appellate court determined that,

"The
affidavit
was
uncontroverted,
uncontradicted, unimpeached, and therefore must be
accepted as t r u e . . . "
(Id. at 1253.)

Since the Defendant could not overcome the

affidavit, the dismissal, based upon a failure to prosecute
after notice, was set aside by the Arizona Court of Appeals.
A review of the foregoing cases demonstrates that they
are neither controlling law, nor are they applicable to the
facts of the case at hand.
POINT NO. 7
MOTHER EARTH DISAGREES WITH SEVERAL OF
THE FACTUAL REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY
FORSGREN-PERKINS IN ITS BRIEF.
In

the

Forsgren-Perkins

representations
record.

brief, a number

of

factual

are made which are not supported

by the

In addition to being unsubstantiated, they appear to

be highly prejudicial in favor of Forsgren-Perkins, and in
several

instances

are

found

in the Statement

Presented for Appeal and Statement of the Case.

of

Issues
A brief

summary of Mother Earth's disagreement with Forsgren-Perkins1
statement of facts is as follows:
1.

At no time did Mother Earth ever enter into a
28

Stipulation with Forsgren-Perkins for a continuance of the
original Motion to Dismiss.
2.

At no time did Forsgren-Perkins either request an

extension of time to respond to the Motion, or receive a
Stipulation that

it had additional time within which to

respond.
Forsgren-Perkins1 suggestion in its Brief of Appellant
that such was the case is not supported by the record, and is
expressly denied by Mother Earth.
POINT NO. 8
FORSGREN-PERKINS SHOULD BE CHARGED WITH
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE THAT THE ORDER OF
DISMISSAL HAD BEEN SIGNED AND ENTERED BY
THE COURT.
Forsgren-Perkins claims to lack any knowledge that the
Order of Dismissal had been signed and entered by the Court.
Forsgren-Perkins was on notice the Order had been sent to the
Court for signature, but made no effort to discover whether
it had been signed and entered.
Forsgren-Perkins1 Memorandum in Re: Order for Change of
Venue or Dismissal Without Prejudice dated June 24, 1987 (R.
119) gives the appearance of knowledge of the entry of the
Order

of

Dismissal.

It

says

Forsgren-Perkins

"takes

exception to the Order of the Court which dismisses the
Complaint without Prejudice."

The Memorandum does not use
29

the word ruling, but distinctly refers to "Order".

In Mother

Earth's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Memorandum
(R. 127), Mother Earth clearly stated in para. 1 that the
"Court

entered

an Order

without prejudice."

dismissing

Plaintiff's

Complaint

Mother Earth gave additional notice the

Order was entered

on page 7 of the Memorandum

(R. 127)

wherein Mother Earth stated:
"There is no provision in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure for a party to take an exception to
an Order entered by a Court. . ."
In

light

of

all the circumstances,

Forsgren-Perkins

should be charged with constructive notice the Order had been
entered, or, at the least, Forsgren-Perkins had an obligation
to investigate the status of the Order.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Respondent seeks to have the Utah Supreme Court dismiss
the

appeal,

or

in

the

alternative

affirm

the

Dismissal entered by the lower Court.
Dated this

day of September, 1989.

Jack L. Schoenhals
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Order of

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I

hereby

certify

that I mailed

four copies of the

foregoing Brief of Respondents to the following this
of September, 1989.
Earl S. Spafford
L. Charles Spafford
Spafford & Spafford
425 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM

PLACE OF TRIAL—VENUE

78-13-1

78-13-1. Actions respecting real property.
Actions for the following causes must be tried in the county in which the
subject of the action, or some part thereof, is situated, subject to the power of
the court to change the place of trial as provided in this code:
(1) For the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein,
or for the determination in any form of such right or interest, and for
injuries to real property.
(2) For the partition of real property.
(3) For the foreclosure of all liens and mortgages on real property.
Where the real property is situated partly in one county and partly in
another, the plaintiff may select either of the counties, and the county so
selected is the proper county for the trial of such action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-13-1.

Cross-References. — Defense of improper
venue, U R.C.P. 12(b), (d).

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: When taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of right from the district court to the Supreme Court,
the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the
district court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order
appealed from; provided however, when a judgment or order is entered in a
statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court within 10
days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the district court by any party (1) for
judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed m the district court by any party
(1) under Rule 24 for a new trial, or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after
judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal
for all parties shall run from the entr\ of the order denying a new trial or
granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
the order of the district court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
Paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the district court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day
thereof.
(d) Additional or cross appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal withm 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or withm the time otherwise
prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The district court, upon a showing of
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of
appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the
time prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule. Any such motion which is filed
before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the district
court otherwise requires. Notice of any such motion which is filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties m accordance
with the district court rules of practice No extension shall exceed 30 days past
the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the
motion, wnichever occurs later

Rule 13, Counterclaim and cross-claim.
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim
any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against
any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the action
was commenced the claim was th$ subject of another pending action, or (2) the
opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other process by
which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on
that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule
13
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or
may not dimmish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party It may
claim rehef exceeding m amount or different m kind from that sought m the
pleading of the opposing party
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which
either matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may,
with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental pleading
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment.
40
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(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim
any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of
the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When the presence of parties
other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete
relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall
order them to be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction of them can be obtained.
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may
be rendered in accordance with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of
the opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of.
(i) Cross demands not affected by assignment or death. When cross
demands have existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one
had brought an action against the other, a counterclaim could have been set
up, the two demands shall be deemed compensated so far as they equal each
other, and neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by the assignment or
death of the other, except as provided in Subdivision (j) of this rule.
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise provided by law as to
negotiable instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been asserted against an assignor at the time of or before notice of such assignment, may be asserted
against his assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim does not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee.
(k) Claim in excess of court's jurisdiction. Where any counterclaim or
cross-claim or third-party claim is filed in an action in a city court or justice's
court, and due to its limited jurisdiction, such court does not have the power to
grant the relief sought thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings in the entire
action and certify the same and transmit all papers therein to the district
court of the county in which such inferior court is maintained, upon the payment by the party filing such counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim of
the fees required for certifying the record on appeal from such court and for
docketing the same in the district court. The fees herein required to be paid,
shall be deposited with the clerk of the inferior court at the time of filing such
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. For failure so to do, the court
may, upon motion of the adverse party, after notice, strike such counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim.
In any action so certified to the district court, when any responsive pleading
is required or permitted or a motion is allowed under these rules, the time in
which such responsive pleading or motion shall be made shall commence to
run from the time notice of the filing of the cause in the district court shall be
served on the party making such responsive pleading or motion.
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Rule 50

iule 50. Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict,
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves
or a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may
)ffer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having
"eserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not
Deen made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a
waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for
directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific
ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed
verdict is effective without any assent of the jury.
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for
any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to
the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his
motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party,
within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the
alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict
was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested
verdict had been directed or may order a new trial.
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion.
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided
for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on
the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be
granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the
motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon
does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new
trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally
denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if
the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in
accordance with the order of the appellate court.
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate
court concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment,
131
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nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether a
new trial shall be granted.
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Rule 52

Rule 52, Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
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Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial m an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jurv or adverse party
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law
(7) Error m law
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment
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Rule 60- Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed m the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or hi- legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons. (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
withm a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in tl ^e
rules or by an independent action.
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Rule 2.8. Motions.
(a) All motions, except uncontested or ex parte matters, shall be accompanied by a brief statement of points and authorities and any affidavits relied
upon in support thereof Points and authorities supporting or opposing a motion for summary judgment shall not exceed five <5) pages in length exclusive
of the 'statement of material facts' as hereinafter provided
lb) The responding party shall file and serve upon all parties within ten
110) days after service of the motion, a statement of answering points and
authorities and counter-affidavits
<c) The moving partv mav serve and file reply points and authorities within
five (5) days after service of responding party's points and authorities Upon
the expiration of such five <"5) day period to file reply points and authorities,
either party may notify the clerk to submit the matter for decision.
<d) The points and authorities m support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material
facts as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists The facts shall be
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall refer with particularity to
those portions of the record upon which movant relies
(e) The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material
facts as to which the paity contends a genuine issue exists Each fact in
dispute shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall refer with
particularity to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party
relies and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the
movant's facts that are disputed All material facts set forth in the statement
of the movant shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment
unless specifically controverted by the statement of the opposing partv
(0 Decision shall be rendered without a hearing unless requested by the
court, in which event the clerk shall set a date and time for such hearing
(g) In all cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action
or any issues thereof on the merits with prejudice, the party resisting the
motion may request a hearing and such request shall be granted unless the
motion is summarily denied If no such request is made within ten (10) davs ot
notice to submit for decision, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived
(h) Provided, however, that any district court and anv circuit court bv older
of the judge or judges of the court mav exclude that court trom the operation of
this Rule 2 8 in which case an alternative procedure shall be prescribed bv
written administrative order or rule

Rule 2.9. Written orders, judgments, and decrees.
(a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for ti e party or parties obtaining the
ruling shall within fifteen (15) davs or within shorter time is the court mav
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity
with the ruling
(b) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and/or otders shall be served
on opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless
the court otherwise orders Notice of objections thereto shall be submitted to
the court and counsel within (5) days after service
(c) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall be reduced to writing and
presented to the court for signature within fifteen 115) davs of the settlement
and dismissal
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EARL S. SPAFFORD (3051)
|E. CHARLES SPAFFORD (4416)
SSPAFFORD & SPAFFORD
[A Professional Corporation
Qll South State Street, #380
•Bait Lake City, Utah 34111
1(801) 531-8020
'Attorneys for Plaintiff, Forsgren-Perkins Engineering
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEAVER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*

*

*

*

FORSGREN-PERKINS ENGINEERING, :
p.a., An Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,
/S.

:
:
MOTHER EARTH INDUSTRIES, INC.,:
a Delaware Corporation, and
:
DELANO DEVELOPMENT, INC., a
Jtah Corporation,
:
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S EXCEPTION TO ORDER
OF DISMISSAL AND REQUEST
FOR HEARING

:
*

*

Civil No. 87-010
*

*

COMES NOW the plaintiff by and through the undersigned
Counsel to respectfully take exception to the Proposed Order of
Dismissal herein and to Move the Court for an opportunity to
address the matter by oral argument, to allow the matter to be
Jfully and fairly addressed on the merits and to provide the Court
With a balanced presentation herein.

DATED this ^ ?

day of May, 1987.

SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD
A Professional Corporation

Earl
L. Charles Spafford
Attorney for Plaintiff,
Forsgren-Perkins Engineering

J.0

EARL S. SPAFFORD (3051)
L. CHARLES SPAFFORD (4416)
JOHN A. DONAHUE (4975)
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD
A Professional Corporation
425 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 363-1234
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BEAVER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FORSGREN-PERKINS,

oooOooo
I
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
MODIFICATION OF ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs .

Civil No. C87-010
MOTHER EARTH INDUSTRIES
Judge J. Phillips Eves
Defendant.

|
oooOooo

COMES NOW the plaintiff to move the above entitled court
for a ruling on plaintiff's objection to order of dismissal and
for an Order modifying the dismissal to allow transfer of these
proceedings in consolidation with the pending Salt Lake County
action herein.
•1.

This Motion is based upon the following grounds:

On April 27,1987, defendant filed a Motion for a

change of Venue or in the alternative to dismiss.
2.

The matter was scheduled for hearing and continued

on at least two occasions by both counsel.
3.

On May 18, 19 87, a Minute Order was entered
1

i a

dismissing the case without prejudice.

Neither counsel were

notified nor present.
4.

On May 28, 19 87, a proposed order dismissing the

case was filed and mailed to plaintiff.

A true and correct copy

of said document is attached hereto and incorporated herein as
Exhibit A.
5.

On May 29, 1987, in conformance with Local Rule of

Practice 2.9(b), plaintiff objected to the proposed order.

A

true and correct copy of said document is attached hereto and
incorporated herein as Exhibit B.
6.

The Objection and Memoranda apparently crossed in

the mail and, on June 2, 19 87 the court entered an Order
dismissing the complaint without prejudice.
7.

At no time, until December 6, 1988, has plaintiff's

counsel received notice that the Order of Dismissal had been
signed.

Notice was first received when plaintiff's attorney

directed his assistant to contact Mr. Schoenhals concerning a
previous oral agreement that the Beaver County action could be
refiled and consolidated with the Salt Lake County action.
During this conversation, Mr. Schoenhals indicated that the
Beaver County action had been dismissed.
8.

We submit that because of the one year statute of

limitations concerning the filing of Mechanic's lien foreclosure
actions, and due to plaintiff's reasonable belief that the
objection to the order of dismissal was pending, and that the
2

17

matter would simply be moved to Salt Lake by stipulation,
plaintiff took no action.

Plaintiff was by no means lax or

careless in its attention to the matter, for plaintiff scheduled
two hearings on its exception to the proposed order, and both
were continued at the request of defendant.
9.

We submit that in the light of the foregoing

circumstances, it is appropriate for the court to modify its
earlier Order dismissing the case, to instead provide for a
change of Venue to the Salt Lake County jurisdiction.
10.

This modification will not substantially harm any

party, as the related case in the Third District is ongoing, and
will be for some time.
DATED this

^/-^ day of- ,4 . c. a >

, 1989.
/
/

SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD
A Professional Corporation

f

2>

L. Charles Spafford
Attorney for the Plaintiff
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^__

L. CHARLES SPAFFORD (4416)
CHASE KIMBALL (4993)
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD
A Professional Corporation
425 East 100 South'
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111
(801) 363-1234
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BEAVER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
FORSGREN-PERKINS ENGINEERING,
]

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
vs .
Civil No. C87-010
MOTHER EARTH INDUSTRIES, and
DELANO DEVELOPMENT,

Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendants.
oooOooo
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF and hereby gives all interested
parties notice of its intent to appeal the ruling of the abovecourt dismissing the case as well as the denial of Plaintiff's
Motion for Modification of Order.
URCP 73 and RUSC 3 and 4.

Said appeal is pursuant to

This appeal is to the Utah Supreme

Court in accordance with UCA §78-2-2(3)(i).
DATED this jf

(_ day of March, 1989.
Spafford & Spafford, P.C.

Chase Kimball
Attorney for Defendant

EXHIBIT G
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